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Abstract
Over the past twenty years, there have been two important trends in
Taiwan’s political economy whose contradictory implications provide an
important explanation for the dramatic events of 2014. The logic of each
pulls Taiwan in different directions. In this paper, we describe one of the
two contending trends of integration and identity. We then discuss the
institutional inheritance from the authoritarian era which we believe is a
factor that makes policymaking in Taiwan quite difficult. We conclude
by analysing how these phenomena interacted to produce the dramatic
events of 2014.
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1. Introduction
Over the past twenty years, there have been two important trends in
Taiwan’s political economy whose contradictory implications provide an
important explanation for the dramatic events of 2014, the Sunflower
Movement and the major losses suffered by the Kuomintang
(KMT) in the local elections. The first of these is the growing sense of a
Taiwanese identity in the country; and the second is the increasing
economic integration across the Taiwan Strait in terms of trade,
investment, integrated production processes, and tourism. The logic of
each pulls Taiwan in different directions. During the presidency of the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s Chen Shui-bian (2000-
2008), the ruling party pushed for more Taiwanization, while the
administration of his successor, the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou ,
pushed for deepening economic linkages with China as the best means
for promoting economic growth. The Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade
in Services that was negotiated by Taiwan and China in 2013 became
highly controversial because it raised fears that it would harm Taiwan
economically and undermine the nation’s sovereignty. The Sunflower
Movement arose in the spring of 2014 when the KMT threatened to ram
the Agreement through the Legislative Yuan with little debate; and in
November the KMT received a devastating thumping at the hands of the
electorate. Our paper will have four parts. The first two will each
describe one of the two contending trends of integration and identity.
The third will discuss a factor that makes policymaking in Taiwan quite
difficult, the institutional inheritance from the authoritarian era. Finally,
we will analyse how the phenomena discussed in the first three parts
interacted to produce the dramatic events of 2014.
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2. Growing Integration across the Taiwan Strait
The past 25 years have been marked by a growing economic integration
between Taiwan and China. By the late 1980s, many of Taiwan’s basic
labor-intensive industries were coming under intense competitive
pressures because the nation’s rising prosperity and wages were pricing
it out of the low-cost labor niche in the global economy. Consequently,
their owners started moving their production facilities off shore to take
advantage of the lower wages that prevailed in countries at lower levels
of development. At first, Southeast Asia was the leading target, but by
the mid-1990s the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had become the
major destination for outward foreign direct investment (FDI) by the
Taiwanese business community. Changed conditions in both Taiwan and
the PRC combined to funnel much of this investment outflow and the
trade that it generated into China. After four decades of almost complete
isolation due to the Cold War hostilities between Taipei and Beij ing,
Taiwan opened the door for cross-Strait interactions when it allowed
indirect trade through third countries in 1984 and then considerably
enhanced the opportunity for “indirect” trade with and investment in the
Chinese mainland over the rest of the decade (Cheng and Chang, 2003;
Clark, 2007; Kastner, 2009). For its part, China was just switching its
strategy for industrial development as well. In particular, the PRC
embarked upon an economic reorientation with a “coastal development
strategy” aimed at attracting the light and labor-intensive industries that
were being priced out of Hong Kong and Taiwan and at using them to
emulate the export-led industrialization of the East Asian capitalist
nations, thereby creating a strong complementarity between the
Taiwanese and Chinese economies. Geographic proximity and a
common culture and language reinforced this complementarity, thereby
making China an extremely attractive base for Taiwanese firms (Kastner,
2009; Leng, 1996; Lin, 2001 ; Naughton, 1 993, 1 997; Wu, 1995).
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Investment in China by Taiwan businesspeople was negligible until
the late 1980s but then took off rapidly. Official data almost certainly
understate the amount of this investment since many Taiwanese firms
sought to evade continuing restrictions. Still, even the cross-Strait
investment flows reported to the Taiwan government (e.g., US$43
billion during the 1990s) are impressive. The nature of Taiwan’s foreign
investment became more large-scale and sophisticated as well. Taiwan
investors moved from joint ventures to solely owned enterprises and
began to build and supply their own factories. Growing trade was
accompanied (in fact, stimulated) by this fairly massive flow of outward
foreign direct investment. This is because Taiwan companies on the
mainland imported machinery and more sophisticated components from
Taiwan for the production (primarily assembly) of goods being exported
to third markets. Thus, this investment produced a huge surge in exports
from Taiwan to China which more than tripled from 5% to 17% of
Taiwan’s total exports between 1989 and 1994, but then stayed at that
level for the rest of the decade.
The structure of these ventures was also upgraded from simple
assembly to upstream heavy and more capital-intensive or high-tech
production. In particular, by the mid- to late 1990s the mix of Taiwan
investment in the PRC began to shift from predominantly small business
in labor-intensive exports to much larger businesses seeking to penetrate
the Chinese market in heavy industry (e.g., Formosa Plastics) and
consumer goods (e.g., President Enterprises). By the end of the decade,
thus, Taiwanese businesses were making a major contribution to the
upgrading ofChina’s economy. For example, at the beginning of the 21 st
century, it was estimated that nearly 75% of China’s information
technology exports came from factories owned by Taiwanese (Bolt,
2001 ; Kastner, 2009; Kuo, 1995; Leng, 1996; Lin, 2001 ; Naughton,
1 997).
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The two sides went well beyond simple trade or the exchange of
goods and services. Rather, Taiwan’s businesses set up integrated
production networks across the Strait in which different stages (e.g.,
design and the manufacture of advanced components in Taiwan and final
assembly in China) were conducted in Taiwan and the PRC (Bolt, 2001 ;
Chu, 1999; Naughton, 1 997; Wu, 1995), creating what Gary Gereffi
(1 998) has called “commodity chains”. Second, the activities of
Taiwanese firms led to a substantial migration of business people to
China in the 1990s, resulting in growing Taiwanese communities in
many mainland cities with, for example, an estimated a half million
Taiwanese citizens living in Shanghai alone. This led some observers
even to comment upon the growing “Taiwanization” of parts of China
(Bolt, 2001 ; Clough, 1999; Cooke, 2006). Increasing interactions across
the Taiwan Strait, moreover, were not just limited to the economic
sphere. A very significant number of Taiwanese also rediscovered their
“roots” in Fujian Province. For example, Murray Rubinstein (1995)
described the fascinating process of cross-Strait “temple politics” in
which temples in Taiwan “adopted” older ones in Fujian.
The past two decades, thus, have witnessed a growing economic
integration between Taiwan and China. The political relations between
the two sides, however, have been anything but calm and stable.
Beginning in the 1990s, there have been a series of contretemps across
the Taiwan Strait based on China’s claims to sovereignty over Taiwan
and Taiwan’s strong rejection of these claims. The tension was especially
high during the presidency of the Democratic Progressive Party’s Chen
Shui-bian (2000-2008) who strongly advocated Taiwanese nationalism.
Following the election of the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou as president in 2008,
tensions eased between Taipei and Beij ing; and several major economic
deals were signed, most importantly the Economic Cooperation
Framework Agreement or ECFA (Bush, 2004, 2013; Clark and Tan,
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2012; Tucker, 2009; Zhao, 1 999). One would have expected, therefore,
that the Chen administration would have seen a decline in economic ties
between Taiwan and China, while the Ma administration would have
produced a substantial revival in cross-Strait economic ties. However,
almost the opposite occurred, leading Clark and Tan (2012) to conclude
that economic relations between China and Taiwan have been primarily
responsive to economic, not political, forces.
Indeed, by the turn of the new century, a new round of increasing
economic interactions across the Taiwan Strait commenced, as both
trade and investment rose fairly consistently until the disruptions of the
Great Recession at the end of the decade. This new spurt of economic
interactions between Taiwan and China was driven by several factors
sequentially. First, when Taiwan’s economy was growing robustly
during 1999 and the first half of 2000, the high-tech component of cross-
Strait relations especially benefited (e.g., two-thirds of the new
investment projects approved during 2000 involved the electronics
industry). One major project in this area, a US$6.4 billion joint venture
for Shanghai semi-conductor plants announced in May 2000, was
certainly fraught with both symbolic and political significance since it
involved the sons of Jiang Zemin , then president of the PRC,
and Y.C. Wang, head of the huge Formosa Plastics empire in Taiwan,
indicating that those with the best reason to know believed that cross-
Strait relations would not blow up despite Chen’s victory. Second, once
the global recession in high-tech production hit Taiwan in the autumn of
2000, many domestically oriented businesses on the island tried to
expand to the Mainland to make up for the deteriorating economic
situation in Taiwan (Bolt, 2001 ; Cooke, 2006). Finally, as Taiwan’s
economy picked up again after the 2001 recession, the initial logic of
economic expansion reasserted itself (Fuller and Rubinstein, 2013). For
example, two thirds of Taiwan’s outward FDI in 2004 went to China
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with 45% of it in the electronics industry (Mainland Affairs Council,
2005).
The rapid growth in cross-Strait interactions during Chen Shui-
bian’s presidency is quite striking in terms of trade and investment data.
Taiwan’s exports to China jumped from US$21 ,000 million to
US$74,000 million in 2007 which increased their share in Taiwan’s total
exports from 17% to 30%, making the PRC Taiwan’s largest trade
partner. As noted above, the official data on Taiwan’s investment in
China almost certainly understate the real figures by a considerable
extent. Yet, they should indicate trends; and they jumped almost four-
fold between 2000 and 2008 (Mainland Affairs Council, 2011 ). In
contrast, despite the signing of ECFA and other trade and investment
agreements during the Ma administration exports have remained at
roughly the levels of 2008; and investment, while spiking in 2010-2011 ,
was back at the 2008 amount in 2014 (Mainland Affairs Council, 2015).
Yet, the explosion of economic interactions across the Taiwan Strait
brought perils with the profits or “an opportunity full of threats” (Rigger,
2011b: 117). First, the very rapid increase of Taiwanese investment in
China (and elsewhere) raised fears that the “hollowing out” of the
Republic ofChina (ROC)’s economy would destroy its past progress and
current prosperity, especially during the two recessions at the beginning
and end of the first decade the 21 st century. Second, the PRC stands out
among developing countries that have been the recipients of the off-
shore movement of basic industries from the developed world in its
ability to upgrade into fairly advanced economic sectors (Naughton,
2007). Consequently, the fact that Taiwanese industry is overwhelmingly
moving to China, rather than other countries with low-cost labor,
represents a more severe threat to the continued viability of its domestic
corporations, as indicated by the rapid movement of increasingly
advanced semiconductor production across the Taiwan Strait noted
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above. Finally, the growing economic integration between China and
Taiwan creates a unique threat and danger to Taipei because of Beij ing’s
claims of sovereignty over Taiwan (Chow, 2008; Clark, 2007; Tucker,
2005, 2009), making it vulnerable to the PRC’s using its economic
dependence for leverage (Yeh and Chi, 2014) as Nazi Germany did in
Eastern Europe during the 1930s (Hirschman, 1980).
3. An Increasingly Taiwanese National Identity
Studies of economic integration have found that it often leads to
“spillover” into growing political ties and feelings of commonality
between the governments and peoples involved (Deutsch, Edinger,
Macridis, and Merritt, 1 967; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1 971 ). However,
this is certainly not the case for Taiwan and China. Since the mid-1990s,
there has been a huge increase in the proportion of Taiwan citizen’s who
identify themselves as Taiwanese as opposed to Chinese or as both
Chinese and Taiwanese (Clark and Tan, 2012; Ho and Liu, 2003; Shen
and Wu, 2008). Consequently, identity and integration in Taiwan were
moving in opposite directions, implying that a clash between them was
highly likely, if not inevitable.
The issue of the national identity of the residents of Taiwan has had
a contentious history during the postwar era. The incorporation of
Taiwan into the Republic of China at the end ofWorld War II after a half
century of Japanese rule was quite inauspicious at first. Despite the fact
that the Taiwanese or Islanders, who had come to Taiwan before it
became a colony, welcomed Chinese troops as liberators, Chiang Kai-
shek and his Kuomintang (KMT) or Nationalist party viewed the
Taiwanese as collaborators of the hated Japanese. In the economic
sphere, the KMT used Taiwan as a source for resources in its battle with
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Chinese Civil War. Thus,
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they dismantled factories and grabbed raw materials for shipment to the
mainland. In addition, the rampant inflation on the mainland was quickly
transmitted to Taiwan. These economic problems were exacerbated by
the harsh political repression imposed by the island’s military
commander Ch’en Yi , which sparked a spontaneous uprising on
February 28, 1 947. A compromise between Ch’en and the Taiwanese
leaders seemed to settle the crisis. However, KMT troops from the
mainland invaded the island in mid-March, killing over 20,000
Taiwanese with the intelligentsia and leadership class being singled out
for slaughter. Although Ch’en was quickly replaced by a more
conciliatory leader and later publicly executed, the trauma and hatred
remained. When Chiang evacuated to Taiwan in late 1949 after losing
the Civil War on the mainland, hence, the top levels of political officials
were primarily Mainlanders who came with the KMT and constituted
about 1 5% of the population (Lai, Myers, and Wei, 1 991 ; Phillips,
2003). Later, after the implementation of the Chinese Cultural
Renaissance Movement in the 1960s, the KMT regime denigrated and
discriminated against local culture and dialects by, for example, treating
the Mandarin dialect as the official language of government and
education, leading to ongoing resentments among the Islanders
(Appleton, 1 976; Cheng, 1994; Lee, 2005; Lynch, 2004; Makeham and
Hsiau, 2005; Tu, 1998; Wang, 2005).
Throughout the authoritarian era, the national identity issue was
kept out of public discourse through strong repression under martial law.
Thus, many feared that Taiwan’s rapid democratic transition in the late
1980s and early 1990s (Chao and Myers, 1 998; Chu, 1992; Copper,
1 997; Tien, 1 996) would unleash a virulent divide over national identity.
Actually, through the 1990s the dynamics of democracy had the opposite
effect of moderating ethnic tensions. As it turned out, strong association
with extremist positions was a loser at the polls. Consequently, Taiwan’s
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parties, especially the two major ones, came under significant pressure to
take moderate positions on national identity (Hsieh, 2002; Lin, 2001 ;
Rigger, 2001 ; Wang, 2000), as “electoral” factions were able to
somewhat suppress the demands of more “ideological” factions in both
major parties (Fell, 2005, 2012).
In contrast, there was a growing polarization of Taiwan’s politics in
the early 21 st century around the national identity issue, following the
dramatic victory of the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian in the 2000 presidential
election. Two distinct types of issues were involved in this polarization.
The first was an ongoing struggle over the “localization” or bentuhua
of the country’s politics and especially culture which was
consistently pushed by the Chen administration (Gold, 1 986; Hsiau,
2005; Jacobs, 2005; Lee, 2005; Wachman, 1994). The second involved
increasingly tense cross-Strait relations with the PRC (Bush, 2013;
Tucker, 2005, 2009). For its part, the KMT returned to a much more
“China-centric” stance after Lee Teng-hui left the party
following its defeat in the 2000 presidential election (Wu, 2011 ). Indeed,
both parties seemed to have reached the conclusion that appealing to
their ideological bases would produce more votes than seeking the
support of the moderate middle.
However, the situation appears to be somewhat more ambiguous
and problematic in Taiwan. Especially during the Chen Shui-bian era,
both the DPP and KMT focused their appeals about national identity
upon their base constituencies much of the time. Yet, these initiatives
(even those by the supposed Independence zealot Chen) appeared
strategic in the sense that appeals to Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism
were turned on and off depending upon the political situation (Clark and
Tan, 2012; Wu, 2011 ). This pattern continued after the KMT’s Ma Ying-
jeou was elected President in 2008. Initially, there was a fierce partisan
struggle over Ma’s rapprochement with China, but national identity and
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cross-Strait relations played only a minor role in the local elections in
2010. National identity was more pronounced in the 2012 presidential
and legislative elections, but the parties were clearly less polarized than
earlier in the decade, as, for example, the DPP did not make the
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, which they had heatedly
opposed when it was negotiated and approved in 2010, a major issue in
their critique of the Ma administration (Copper, 2011 ; Fell, 2012;
Rigger, 2010, 2012; Tien and Tung, 2011 ).
Wei-chin Lee (2005) contrasts Chen Shui-bian’s approach to
creating a new national identity for Taiwan with that of his predecessor
Lee Tung-hui in the 1990s. Lee sought to create a Taiwanese nationalism
and nation that could encompass all residents of the country,
representing what has been called “civic nationalism” (Shen and Wu,
2008). This can be seen in his attempt to create the basis for a new
national identity during the very high-profile 1998 campaign for Taipei’s
mayor in which the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou challenged Chen Shui-bian,
the popular DPP incumbent with approval ratings of 70%. To help Ma
overcome the disadvantage of his ethnic heritage, Lee had him proclaim
his loyalty to Taiwan in a manner that redefined the categories of
national identity on the island:
Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui added drama to the Taipei mayoral
campaign when he asked the KMT nominee, Ma Ying-jeou, “Where is
your home place?” Ma, a Mainlander, replied in broken Minnan
dialect, “I’m a New Taiwanese, eating Taiwanese rice and drinking
Taiwanese water.”
(Rigger, 1 999a: 48)
Lee’s concept of a “New Taiwanese” identity was open to everyone and
implied that old ethnic enmities could be left in the past, creating a new
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approach to national identity that appeared to be widely popular across
the political spectrum (Brown, 2004; Rigger, 1 999a).
In contrast to Lee Teng-hui’s broader understanding of a developing
Taiwan nation, Lee (2005) believed that Chen Shui-bian was more
concerned with appealing to specific groups in what has been called
“ethnic nationalism” (Shen and Wu, 2008). In particular, by the middle
of the decade, the DPP was primarily appealing to the Minnan ethnic
group who had come to Taiwan from Fujian Province and constituted
slightly over 70% of the population. In contrast, while the DPP paid lip
service to the slogan of the “Four Great Ethnic Groups” (Makeham,
2005), some prominent DPP leaders disparaged not just Mainlanders, a
little under 15% of the population, but also two groups of Islanders:
Hakka, about the same size as Mainlanders, and aborigines, about 2% of
the population (Copper, 2010). Consequently, the Chen approach was
much more polarizing than Lee’s strategy.
The polarization over national identity and cross-Strait relations in
the elite discourse and party competition in Taiwan would strongly
suggest that such polarization exists among the general electorate as well
for either of two reasons. The elites might have responded to a sharp
polarization in public opinion; or the citizenry may have become more
polarized once the elite debate brought the issue to the center of
Taiwan’s politics. If neither of these conditions existed and a majority of
Taiwanese were in the “moderate middle,” the major parties would have
a strong incentive to moderate their policies or risk punishment at the
polls.
A variety of public opinion data cast doubt upon the image of a
polarized electorate, however, as many of Taiwan’s citizens possess a
complex identity that includes both Taiwanese and Chinese components
and are wary about extreme positions on cross-Strait relations (Brown,
2004; Rigger, 1 999a; Wachman, 1994). For the last two decades, public
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opinion surveys have asked whether people identify themselves as
Chinese, Taiwanese, or a combination of both. In 1992 just over half the
population (52%) expressed a dual identity, while Chinese identifiers
slightly outnumbered Taiwanese ones (28% to 20%). This changed
dramatically in just eight years. In 2000, about half the population (47%)
still had dual identification, but Taiwanese identifiers outnumbered
Chinese ones 39% to 14%. The Chen Shui-bian years continued this
trend as Taiwanese identification grew from 39% to 51% between 2000
and 2008, while Chinese identification collapsed further to just 4%.
Finally, Taiwanese identifiers continued to increase to 55% at a slower
rate during the first two years of the Ma administration (Election Center,
1 992, 2000, 2008, 2010).
These data certainly show that the “China-centered paradigm” was a
thing of the past in Taiwan, as by 2008 or even 2000 the number of
purely Chinese identifiers in Taiwan had become minuscule. Wang and
Chang (2005) show that this trend was even pronounced among
Mainlanders. Chinese identifiers among Mainlanders fell by almost a
half from 57% to 29% between just 1 994 and 2000 and then fell by
nearly a half again to 16% by 2004. Even before the sharp polarization
of the 2000s, therefore, Chinese identifiers were a decided minority of
the small Mainlander minority (1 3%) of the total population; and the
decline in Chinese identification among Mainlanders continued apace
during the first Chen administration despite his escalating appeals to
Taiwanese nationalism. Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese Cultural Renaissance
Movement was surely dead and buried.
Evaluating the degree of polarization versus moderation concerning
the “Taiwan-centric paradigm” is a little more problematic and
ambiguous, though. Clearly, a strong and steady increase in Taiwanese
identification occurred over the last decade of the 20th century and the
first one in the 21 st. These data, however, support two quite different
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interpretations. On the one hand, there clearly was a massive shift
toward Taiwanese identification (Ho and Liu, 2003; Shen and Wu, 2008)
which is consistent with the argument that Chen Shui-bian was able to
create a new nation rooted in Taiwanese history and culture (Lynch,
2004). This was expressed during the 2004 campaign not just by the
supporters of Chen and Lee Teng-hui. Rather, it could also be seen in the
actions and words of the Kuomintang leadership. For example, during
their final massive campaign rallies both Lien Chan and James
Soong , the presidential and vice-presidential candidates, kissed
the ground in Taipei and Taichung respectively to demonstrate their
devotion and loyalty to Taiwan (Huang, 2004); and Lien Chan, the KMT
Chairman, was quoted as saying, “There is one state on each side of the
Taiwan Strait”, thereby echoing what was seen as a provocative
argument by Chen Shui-bian just two years earlier (Rawnsley, 2004).
On the other hand, the continuing strong minority of citizens who
profess a dual identity is inconsistent with the image of the new totally
Taiwanese nation that was supposedly created by what Wei-chin Lee
(2005) termed Chen’s “Cultural Reconstruction Movement”. This can
also be seen in how the public views the best option for Taiwan’s
international status: 1 ) Taiwan Independence, 2) the current status quo of
an uncertain sovereignty, or 3) Unification with the PRC. Over the last
two decades, marked majorities of about 60% have supported the
diplomatic status quo, ambiguous and even ridiculous as it may be.
There was a major change in attitudes about this item over time, though.
In particular, between 1994 and 2010 the relative support for
Independence and Unification flip-flopped from 14%-25% to 24%-12%
(Election Center, 1 992, 2000, 2008, 2010). Still, since the Taiwan-
centric paradigm advocates Independence, popular opinion does appear
to be dominated by the moderate middle.
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This strong and continuing support for the status quo in Taiwan’s
international status is especially striking because, as Rigger (2004) has
noted, growing frustration across the political spectrum with Taiwan’s
lack of international status and with its treatment by the PRC is very
easy to discern. Rather, the dangers of the two extremes are so
pronounced that the not particularly satisfactory current situation is
accepted as tolerable. In short, the “moderate middle” in Taiwan almost
certainly does not have any hesitation in affirming “Taiwan, Yes! ”
However, its Taiwan-centric allegiances fall considerably short of what
the proponents of Taiwan Independence consider to be necessary for a
Taiwan nation. For example, Shelley Rigger’s (2011a) interviews of
young people found that even the term “Love Taiwan” was viewed with
suspicion because it had become so politicized. Thus, Chen’s Cultural
Reconstruction Movement may have over-reached, just as Chiang Kai-
shek’s Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement did.
4. Taiwan’s Institutional Imbroglio
The complex contradictions between integration and identity that were
charted in the last two sections are now exacerbated by what Clark and
Tan (2012) call the “institutional imbroglio” in Taiwan’s political
system. It is widely assumed that a nation’s political and economic
institutions shape public policy to a considerable extent (March and
Olsen, 1 989; North, 1 990; Riker, 1 982). John Fuh-sheng Hsieh (2006,
2009) has developed an interesting model of Taiwan’s institutional
legacy based on the difference between presidential or parliamentary
governmental systems and between election systems with single-
member districts (SMDs) or proportional representation (PR). From this
perspective, Taiwan’s current institutional imbroglio results from a
combination of a complex and somewhat indeterminate constitutional
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system, an election system that contained some perverse incentives, and
its long era of authoritarian rule. Indeed, Hsieh (2006: 99) concludes that
“actual constitutional practice in Taiwan [is] . . . contrary to the
constitutional arrangement on paper.”
Originally, the government for the Republic of China on Taiwan
was (and still essentially is) structured around the 1947 Constitution.
This Constitution created the institutions for a liberal democracy and
guaranteed civil rights and liberties, although many of its provisions
were nullified by the authoritarian rule of the KMT. Thus, at the national
level, there were five basic governmental organizations: the Executive
Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Control Yuan, and the
Examination Yuan. An indirectly elected president stood above these
five branches and served as the top political official in the nation
(Ch’ien, 1 950; Copper, 1 979; Winckler, 1 984).
The keystone for government was the president, who until 1 995 was
indirectly elected for six-year terms. The president possessed important
constitutional powers, but there were also significant limitations on them
as well. He appointed the premier who headed the Executive Yuan and
also had appointment powers for the Judicial and Examination Yuans.
Moreover, the president became the focal points for several important
decision-making bodies, such as the National Security Council that was
founded by Chiang Kai-shek in 1967. The NSC has been generally
composed of some of the top officials in the regime and seemingly has
served as a “super cabinet” at many times. Constitutionally, however,
the president did not really appear to be the chief executive. It was the
premier who selected and presided over the cabinet; and, at least on
paper, the premier and the cabinet were responsible to the Legislative
Yuan. It was somewhat ambiguous, therefore, whether the ROC
Constitution created a presidential or cabinet system because the exact
division of labor between the president and premier was somewhat
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unclear and has depended upon their personal power positions. In reality,
except for the brief period after Chiang Kai-shek’s death when his vice-
president finished out his term, the president has always been
preeminent (Barnett, 1 963; Ch’ien, 1 950; Gurtov, 1 968; Hsieh, 2006).
The Legislative Yuan or Taiwan’s parliament is a directly elected
body. Even during the long authoritarian era, it passed budgets and
legislation and exercised oversight over the executive (e.g., the
Executive and Legislative Yuans had vetoing and overriding powers
fairly similar to those exercised by the president and Congress in the
United States). In reality, the Legislative Yuan was fairly weak, and it is
probably fair to describe it as a “rubber stamp” on major policies before
the 1990s. Still, the Legislative Yuan held the very important formal
power of having to approve presidential appointments of premiers
(Ch’ien, 1 950; Hsieh, 2006). More informally, legislators did exercise
considerable initiative in such important areas as amending legislation,
constituent service, local development projects, and overseeing the
executive in public interpellation sessions (Chou, Clark, and Clark,
1 990).
The formal constitutional structure for any country, of course, is
subject to significant modification by informal political practices. This
occurred to an extreme extent in authoritarian Taiwan. Not only were the
Constitution’s democratic intent and institutions subverted, but an
outline of the nation’s governmental bodies completely ignores the
central role of the ruling Kuomintang Party. Major decisions about
policy and personnel were evidently approved, if not made, by the top
party organizations rather than the official government (e.g., the KMT’s
Central Standing Committee had to approve the premier’s cabinet
choices); and the Executive Yuan was viewed as much more of a policy
implementer than initiator. The party also had fairly extensive ties with
society through such organizations as the China Youth Corps and
330 Cal Clark and Alexander C. Tan
Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations:
An International Journal 2(1) ♦ 2016
Farmers’ Associations. The strong presidential leadership that has
marked Taiwan’s politics was based to a goodly extent on control of the
ruling party as both Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo
were strong chairmen of the KMT through their presidencies (Bedeski,
1 981 ; Clough, 1978; Copper, 1 979; Tai, 1 970). This continued in the
democratic era, as Lee Teng-hui was chairman of the KMT throughout
his presidency (1988-2000) and Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou were
chairs of their respective parties for part of their terms.
Despite this structure of a party-state and a substantial amount of
repression directed against those who challenged the regime, the KMT
on Taiwan departed from the totalitarian model in one vital respect.
Rather than destroying all pre-existing political and social groups, the
regime tried to co-opt and manipulate them whenever possible. This
resulted in the Mainlander “national” elite playing “local” Islander
factions off against each other and retaining power by acting as the
arbitrator among them. This also made elections for local governments
and Farmers’ Associations “real” and often fiercely competitive, which
had somewhat contradictory implications for Taiwan’s future political
development. On the one hand, a significant basis or starting point was
created for democratic expansion; on the other, these local bodies were
strongly focused on political patronage which was often tied to
corruption (Bosco, 1 994; Clark, 1 989; Rigger, 1 999b; Tien, 1 989).
This turns attention to the somewhat rare type of election system
which Taiwan imported from its former colonial master Japan. As noted
above, the two major types of election systems are single-member
districts (SMDs) in which the person who gets the most votes wins and
proportional representation (PR) in which a party wins the number of
seats in a multi-member district that is proportionate to its share of the
vote. Taiwan’s traditional system of what is called the single
nontransferable vote or SNTV combines elements of both systems. The
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candidates for legislative seats run in multi-member districts as in PR.
However, each voter can only cast one ballot for a specific candidate
(not a party) which cannot be transferred to a second or third alternative
if the candidate does not win. The candidates are ranked according to the
votes they receive, and the number elected is determined by the size of
the district. For example, if a district has eight seats, the eight candidates
with the highest number of votes are the winners. Consequently, in large
districts fairly small minorities can elect a representative (Hsieh, 2009).
This system appears to have ambiguous implications for the party
system. SMDs are usually considered to promote competitive two-party
systems because minor party candidates are difficult to elect. This
promotes the ability of the citizenry to hold a government accountable
but makes the representation of some specific constituencies hard
because the major parties must retain a broad appeal. Conversely, a PR
system promotes a multi-party system that is good for representation but
can undermine accountability. The SNTV system promotes
representation by individual legislators but undermines representation by
a party because candidates of the same party must compete against each
other as well as against the representatives of other parties, which
undercuts the cohesion and responsibility of the parties. As John Hsieh
(2009: 1 2) explains nicely:
Since the vote shares of these two parties [the DPP and KMT] are,
under normal circumstances, relatively fixed, it can be expected that
candidates from the same party will compete against each other for
the same pool of voters. In fact, this kind of intraparty competition is
more often than not fiercer than competition between the two parties.
As voters make their choices, they often first determine which party to
vote for, and then pick one out of several candidates from that party.
Since the platforms of these candidates are likely to be similar, voters
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need to rely upon other cues to make their choices, including personal
connections, pork-barrel projects, or even vote buying. Elections may
become very personalized. In addition, since each party, in general,
wants all its candidates to win, and often needs to show impartiality
among its own candidates, these candidates may have to turn to other
sources of support to compete against their co-partisans. Factions, big
businesses, or even gangsters may be dragged into the process.
Corruption may thus sneak in. Moreover, because a candidate may
need only a small portion of the vote in the district to get elected, he
or she may choose to take extreme positions to attract the support of
certain groups of voters. In this way, radicalization may become a
constant feature of political life.
There seems to be a parallel between Taiwan’s constitutional and
electoral systems, therefore. The constitutional system combined
elements of both parliamentary and presidential governments in a
somewhat incoherent system that was held together by authoritarian one-
party rule. The election system was neither SMD nor PR and appeared to
undercut the incentives that one or the other might have provided for
establishing a particular type of party system. Democratization, as might
well have been expected, exacerbated these problems. The incoherence
and ambiguities of the constitutional system became increasingly
apparent as competing political forces were given free rein to pursue
conflicting interests and goals, and the growing importance of elections
accentuated the dysfunctions of the SNTV system.
John Fuh-sheng Hsieh (2006) provides a broader and more
theoretical critique of Taiwan’s political system. He argues that
constitutional systems can be ranked along a continuum from the liberal
objective of protecting human rights to promoting efficient policy-
making, with the checks-and-balances of a presidential system
Sunflower Movement and the Kuomintang’s Loss in the 2014 Elections 333
CCPS Vol. 2 No. 1 (April 2016)
promoting the former and the unified decision-making of a
parliamentary system being conducive to the latter. Election systems,
similarly, can promote the populist value of individual representation or
efficient policy-making by majority parties with PR systems providing
the former and SMD ones the latter. He then uses these distinctions to
create a typology of four different kinds of democracies. He classifies
Taiwan as a presidential system in practice (though fairly parliamentary
in constitutional design) and quite populist, at least under the old SNTV
system. This creates a “hyperdemocracy” which, according to Hsieh, is
the least desirable type because of its tendency for political stalemate
and ideological polarization, exactly the problems facing Taiwan today.
5. The Conflict between Identity and Integration Hits Home: The
Sunflower Movement and Implosion of the KMT
The contradictory trends in identity and integration were probably
destined to clash sooner or later. Still, their violent collision in 2014 was
surprisingly spectacular. The student Sunflower Movement was
organized quickly during the evening of March 17th after the KMT
announced that it would ram the controversial Cross-Strait Service Trade
Agreement (CSSTA) through the Legislative Yuan and occupied the
Legislative Yuan the next day with the aid of opposition lawmakers. The
Sunflowers ultimately succeeded in that the Legislative Yuan did not
pass the CSSTA. More broadly, they stimulated and symbolized what
appears to be a fundamental change in Taiwan’s politics. First, in terms
of the partisan balance, the KMT emerged from this crisis widely
discredited as it took an unprecedented beating in the 2014 local
elections and seemed to be in disarray as the 2016 presidential and
parliamentary elections approached. Second, the Sunflower Movement
marked a major change in the role of civil society in Taiwan politics, as
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students, civic organizations, nonprofit groups or NGOs
(nongovernmental organizations), and general citizens successfully
demanded that they be allowed to participate in the nation’s major
decisions.
The storm of 2014 had been building for two years. In January
2012, President Ma Ying-jeou won re-election by a margin of 52% to
46% over the DPP’s Tsai Ing-wen . This was considerably less
than his margin in 2008, and the KMT’s majority in Legislative Yuan
saw a similar reduction. Still, Taiwan’s citizens had given Ma and the
KMT a vote of confidence. It turned out to be an extremely short
mandate. Within six months of his election, Ma’s approval rating had
plummeted to 15%, which broke Chen Shui-bian’s record low of 18%,
and his popularity never rose very significantly after that. This
tumultuous drop reflected the confluence of several factors. First, Ma, as
is common among many incumbent chief executives, put off several
unpopular decisions until after he was re-elected. These included steep
rises in oil and electricity prices in response to the global jump in energy
prices, a capital gains tax on stock transactions in response to the
country’s budget squeeze, and the re-emergence of the ongoing
controversy over beef imports from the United States. Second, the
secretary general of the Executive Yuan, a Ma protégé, was arrested for
bribery, thereby doing substantial damage to Ma’s image as a clean
politician. In addition, China undercut Ma’s claims that he was
successfully managing relations with Beij ing by issuing a thinly veiled
rebuke of a speech he made on cross-Strait relations, and Taiwan’s
economy slowed markedly from 4.2% growth in 2011 to 1 .5% in 2012.
Finally, Ma’s troubles were compounded by growing strains within the
Kuomintang which weakened his ability to pass items in his program
through the legislature (Chen, 2013; Hsieh, 2014).
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The stage for the Sunflower Movement was set when the Ma
administration signed the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement with
Beij ing on June 21 , 2013. This was a key extension of Ma’s program to
promote development and prosperity in Taiwan by increasing the
island’s economic integration with China. What the CSSTA sought to do
was to extend the liberalization of trade and investment in goods in
ECFA and other agreements to the service sector. In all, 80 service
segments in China were opened for Taiwanese investment, while 64
segments in Taiwan became available for Chinese investors. This was a
major proposal that included financial services, communications, health
and social services, business services, transportation, tourism,
environmental services, and distribution services. The Agreement
immediately became highly controversial. This was far from surprising
for two distinct reasons. Since 2000, cross-Strait relations had probably
been the most important issue dividing the DPP and KMT; and trade
agreements in services are generally harder to be negotiated than those
for goods, in part because issues concerning such areas as
communications and financial services are often seen as threatening the
sovereignty of small nations, which is a highly salient and sensitive issue
in Taiwan. A central criticism of the CSSTA was that it had been
negotiated in secret. It might be argued that this criticism was somewhat
spurious because most international agreements are negotiated out of the
public view. However, this does not absolve the party who negotiated the
treaty, in this case the Ma administration and the Kuomintang, from
responding to questions and criticisms. Rather, the very secrecy of the
negotiations makes justifying the agreement all the more vital. In the
case of the Service Trade Agreement, there were valid fears that China’s
great wealth would allow it to “buy up” Taiwanese firms in such
sensitive areas as banking and telecommunications, despite predictions
of the pact’s supporters that Taiwanese firms would benefit greatly from
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their enhanced access to the Mainland market. More broadly, this
criticism came in a context of growing fears of potential Chinese
domination of Taiwan among Taiwanese citizens and a growing
realization that economic integration across the Strait was contributing
significantly to the growing inequality in Taiwan and that the strong
economic links with China were transmitting the slowing economic
growth there to Taiwan, which was especially harmful to the future
prospects of students (Fan, 2014; Hsieh, 2014, 2015).
The Ma administration seemingly realized the breadth and
seriousness of the opposition to the CSSTA; and within a week of
concluding the Agreement with China; it agreed to a clause-by-clause
review in the Legislative Yuan. Then in late September, the KMT and
DPP agreed on 16 public hearings, with each party chairing eight. It was
here that the process broke down as both parties displayed rather
questionable faith in providing a full and fair hearing of the issues
involved in the CSSTA. The KMT quickly ran through their eight
hearings, while the DPP delayed holding theirs. Even more ominously, a
battle between President Ma and Speaker of the House Wang Jin-pyng
that exploded earlier in the month was seen by many observers
as being tied to the CSSTA. Ma charged that Wang had lobbied on
behalf of the convener of the DPP caucus in a judicial case and asked the
KMT Discipline Committee to revoke his party membership. Since
Wang had been elected to the Legislative Yuan as a party-list candidate,
this would have removed him from the legislature. Ma’s tactics drew
widespread criticism, especially after it was revealed that the charges
were based on somewhat questionable wire taps by the Special
Investigations Division of the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office, and Wang
sought judicial intervention. Ultimately, there was some reconciliation
between Ma and Wang, and Wang continued as speaker. There had been
antagonism between these two politicians dating back to Ma’s defeat of
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Wang in the election for KMT party chair. Beyond this rivalry, many
observers believed that Ma intended to ram the CSSTA through the
Legislative Yuan, which Wang’s more conciliatory relations with the
DPP might have prevented (Hsieh, 2004; Shieh, Mo, and Wang. 2013;
Smith and Yu, 2014).
No progress was made for almost six months, as the Ma
administration showed no interest in compromise, and the DPP showed
no interest in moving forward in the Legislative Yuan’s consideration of
the SSSTA. Then a volcano erupted in mid-March 2014. On March 17th,
a Joint Committee Review Meeting on the CSSTA in the Legislative
Yuan ended in chaos. Lawmakers from the DPP and Taiwan Solidarity
Union (TSU) seized the podium and prevented the KMT’s Chang Ching-
chung from presiding. Three hours of slogan chanting and
confrontation ensued. Finally, Chang declared that the meeting was over
and that the review period was complete, clearing the way for a vote on
the trade pact and leading the DPP to protest vociferously that this move
violated the cross-party consensus on reviewing the CSSTA item-by-
item. The next day, protests commenced outside the Legislative Yuan,
and in the evening, students accompanied by some DPP legislators
entered and occupied the Legislative Yuan, thereby setting off the
Sunflower Movement (Fan, 2014; Hsieh, 2015; Smith, 2015; Smith and
Yu, 2014; Wang, 2014a).
The Sunflower students presented four demands. First, the CSSTA
should be reviewed clause-by-clause and renegotiated; second, a
mechanism for monitoring cross-Strait agreements should be put in
place; third, the CSSTA should not go into effect until such monitoring
procedure was operational; and fourth, a Citizens’ Constitutional
Assembly should be called. The Ma administration ignored these
demands and indicated that the CSSTA should be approved as it is,
creating a stalemate. For his part, KMT speaker Wang Jin-pyng allowed
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the occupation to continue but did not try to negotiate with them, and
massive demonstrations were held around the island. Some students
managed to enter the Executive Yuan late on May 23rd, but they were
later expelled with a considerable amount of force, deepening the crisis.
The occupation of the Legislative Yuan continued for five weeks until
Speaker Wang agreed to develop and implement a program for
monitoring cross-Strait agreements before acting on the CSSTA. Due to
partisan polarization, however, nothing happened (Hsieh, 2015; Liu,
2014; Smith, 2015; Smith and Yu, 2014; Sui, 2015 Wang, 2014a, 2014b;
Wei, Wang, and Hsu, 2014).
Overall, the Sunflower Movement appears to be very successful in
several areas. It stopped the CSSTA from being rammed through the
Legislative Yuan. Public opinion polls in the spring of 2014 showed it to
have extremely strong public support. It also represented and stimulated
an outburst of fervor by civil society and individual citizens to have a
part in decision-making in the fundamental issues facing Taiwan,
although how lasting this effect will be is still unclear. In political terms,
the Sunflower success made a major contribution, although certainly not
the only one, to the fall of the KMT, which was trounced in the 2014
local elections and was trailing badly in the run-up to the presidential
and legislative elections in January 2016 (Hsieh, 2015; Loa, 2015b;
Smith, 2015; Sui, 2015).
6. Implications
The last section might be taken to indicate that the clash between
integration and identity has resulted in the preeminence of the later. The
reality seems to be more complex, as indicated by the results of two
recent polls. First, the surge in support for the Sunflower Movement and
the DPP suggests that a similar surge in support for Taiwan
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Independence should have occurred. A United Daily News poll in
September 2015 presents a different picture, however. Taiwanese
perceptions of China are anything but favorable as the Chinese
government and Chinese people were rated as “bad” rather than “good”
by approximately two-to-one margins of 58% to 28% and 51% to 28%
respectively. Still, 55% of Taiwanese prefer the status quo versus 28%
who want Unification and 13% who want Independence. When those
who want the status quo in the short term before either Independence or
Unification are added, an overwhelming 76% of the population supports
the status quo (Loa, 2015a). This does not just reflect the fear of China’s
rising military strength. Younger Taiwanese in their 20s and 30s are
much more likely than their elders to have a wholly Taiwanese identity
and to favor Independence. Yet, a third of them want to work in China,
implying that the Chinese economy retains a major pull in Taiwan (Sui,
2015). Consequently, the contradictory forces of integration and identity
will continue to bedevil Taiwan.
A more positive implication is that Taiwan appears to be moving
toward what Shen and Wu term “civic nationalism” in which the source
of nationalism is support for the country and nation. This can be seen in
the rising importance of civil society as illustrated by the Sunflower
Movement and by the changing debate over national identity. In the fall
of 2015, for example, President Ma and the DPP presidential candidate
Tsai, rather than presenting rival proposals for Unification and
Independence, both claimed to be the supporters of the status quo in
cross-Strait relations. Ma claimed that his policies had successfully
preserved the status quo, while Tsai contended that she and the DPP
were committed to preserving the status quo (Sui, 2015).
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